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COMMENTS ON OWEN M. FISS, AGAINST
SETTLEMENT (1984)
Jack B. Weinstein*
INTRODUCTION
It is strange to be commenting about a debate between Professors Derek
Bok (for settlement) and Owen Fiss (against settlement) twenty-five years
after the event. Given the high intellect of both scholars, you can anticipate
our conclusion: "Both arguments have merit."
Federal judges tend to be biased toward settlement. We are the kitchen
help in litigation. We clean the dishes and cutlery so they can be reused for
the long line of incoming customers. Settlements are the courts' automatic
washer-dryers.
Since this is the two hundredth anniversary of President Abraham
Lincoln's birth, it is interesting to consider his view as a lawyer who
participated in the social and legal controversies of the small cities, towns,
and rural communities of mid-nineteenth-century Illinois. In his book, A.
Lincoln: A Biography, Ronald C. White, Jr., notes that Lincoln had "grown
up as a lawyer in a face-to-face society in which he urged his clients to
settle because they had to live with one another in small communities."1
Score that one in Professor Bok's column.
Much of today's litigation does not arise from eye-to-eye disputes, but
between disconnected people and institutions. Mass cases involve harms
perpetrated by powerful distant actors-"repeat players," as some would
put it-on anonymous individuals, most without the slightest clue to how
the legal system can protect them. And, as Professor Adam Zimmerman of
New York University Law School points out in his forthcoming article in
the Duke Law Journal, left to their own devices under such circumstances,
people's litigation and settlement choices often tend to be irrational, that is
to say, nonbeneficial, for themselves. 2
Score that one in Professor Fiss's column.
The relationships between potential plaintiffs and defendants in mass
cases are often tenuous, transient, and troubled. Yet, the settlement ethic
pressed by Lincoln still seems apt even in our society of faceless
interactions.
* Senior District Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
1. RONALD C. WHITE, JR., A. LINCOLN: A BIOGRAPHY 210 (2009).
2. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DuKE L.J. (forthcoming Mar.
2010) (manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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Settlements may be even more desirable in the mass commercial age in
which we now live. Unsettled disputes about harms to large numbers of
people across geographic and demographic lines, caused by large entities,
present risks of social breakdowns without fair, timely, and efficient
resolution. Time-consuming adjudication results in excessive transaction
costs and unnecessary stress on individuals, families, local and national
economies, and government service networks. If we persist in trying each
dispute as if it were a unique horse-and-buggy collision at a muddy
intersection in nineteenth-century Cairo, Illinois, businesses may be
unfairly saddled with continuing litigations while individuals claiming harm
may be left almost indefinitely adrift.
Most mass tort cases must be disposed of by settlement. Trying each of
them would completely overwhelm the nation's courts. For example,
Zyprexa, an antipsychotic drug, was administered to hundreds of thousands
of people with psychiatric illnesses, causing a large number of them to
suffer serious side effects such as weight gain and diabetes. Zyprexa users
have brought claims and potential suits based on the drug company's failure
to warn of these dangerous side effects and on illegal sales programs for
off-label usage. More than 30,000 of these cases were transferred to the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York from federal
district courts throughout the United States pursuant to an order of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.3 Almost all of these individual
Zyprexa claims have been settled. Similar cases have been litigated and
almost all have been settled in state courts.
Had all such cases been tried, they would have overwhelmed our courts
for many years. There are less than 2500 civil jury trials in the U.S. federal
courts each year.4 Trying tens of thousands of individual Zyprexa and other
civil cases would require multiplying the number of federal and state
judges. 5  This prospect alone casts serious doubts on Professor Fiss's
aspiration of litigation-without-settlement.
Mass settlements without adjudications and contracts of adhesion
requiring arbitration-as in securities, labor, franchising, and the like-do
inhibit some useful development of the substantive law. There is then, as
Fiss pointed out, inadequate opportunity for policy development by the
courts or the legislature acting for the public as a whole. 6
3. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
4. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 2008, at 137 tbl.C, 180 tbl.C-7 (2008) (noting 2175 civil trials in federal court in
twelve-month period ending Sept. 30, 2008, with 267,257 federal civil lawsuits filed during
that time).
5. There are an estimated 149,000 jury trials in state courts across the country per year;
about thirty-one percent of those are civil trials. See GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-
AGER & NICOLE L. WATERS, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES
SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS 7 & tbl.3 (2007).
6. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR, Il OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 241 (1996) (describing theoretical and
practical aspects of Alternative Dispute Resolution).
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Yet, once relatively few cases in a multiparty dispute are disposed of
individually by trial or summary judgment, sensible policy governing the
matter can be determined, and the vast bulk of cases can be settled on
reasonable terms. Available then are consolidated discovery, value
matrices, controlled attorneys' fees, cooperation between state and federal
courts, 7 and assurance that windfalls and inexplicable denials of remedies
are avoided through class or quasi-class action dispositions.
To demonstrate why one size-full litigation or full settlement-does not
fit all cases, it may be useful to touch on some of the complex cases I have
been involved in. My experience with them supports the view that in some
cases full litigation of claims should be encouraged to avoid settlements that
hide critical facts or substantive developments from the public, precluding
(1) adequate compensation to those who were not aware of their rights or
injuries and (2) necessary institutional and legal reform. 8  In other
instances, reasonably prompt settlement is desirable and can be achieved
without a significant number of trials or summary dispositions. In still
other cases, some trials and summary judgments are useful in creating an
appropriate framework for settlement of most claims.
I. WHEN SETTLEMENT Is NOT DESIRABLE
There are cases in which settlement is not desirable. This was apparent
from my work with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on the briefs and
related negotiations among those diverse groups dedicated to eliminating
racial discrimination. The two most important cases on which I worked
were Brown v. Board of Education9 and the One Person-One Vote
dispute.' 0 They required showdown litigation rather than settlement.
7. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (U.S. Judicial Conference 2009).
Canon 4A(4) states, "A judge should not act as an arbitrator or mediator or otherwise
perform judicial functions apart from the judge's official duties unless expressly authorized
by law." Id. Canon 4A(4). The Commentary to Canon 4A(4) states, "This Canon generally
prohibits a judge from mediating a state court matter, except in unusual circumstances (e.g.,
when a judge is mediating a federal matter that cannot be resolved effectively without
addressing the related state court matter)." Id. Canon 4A(4) cmt. (emphasis added). This is
much too narrow a view of cooperation and mediation among state and federal judges. Such
coordination in resolving disputes is desirable and common. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
239 F.R.D. 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (including a "Communication to State Judges on
Cooperation Between Federal and State Judges"); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 20.14 (2004) (including a section on "Coordination Between Courts"); MANUAL
FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1997); Francis E. McGovern,
Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851,
1858 (1997).
8. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, A New Way Forward: A Response to Judge
Weinstein, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 168; Jack B. Weinstein, Letter to Professor
Burch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 192; Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on
Administration of Complex Litigations, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964).
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In Brown, settlements were not possible. The cases were litigated in
several states and the District of Columbia. Settlements were proposed in
some instances to provide claimed "real equality" for students at schools
that would remain segregated; they were properly rejected by the plaintiffs.
The cases had to be decided on the facts and the law at the trial and
Supreme Court levels if we were to tear down the barriers to racial equality.
A great deal of subsequent litigation was necessary since school disputes
were fact specific and required a fundamental change in national
educational opportunity and desegregation policies.
In the One Person-One Vote cases, litigation was also essential. New
York's "rotten boroughs," which provided disproportionate representation
for rural communities, could not be tolerated. I wrote for the brief for
Nassau County in a case that was argued in the Supreme Court."1 I
participated not only in the New York litigation, 12 but also in the related
political efforts to redraw lines for legislative districts. Those of us working
on the problem traveled throughout the state, meeting with unions and other
groups and trying to get fair apportionment through the legislature-
without success. Why would a farmer in northern New York give up his
extra voting power to help a Nassau County suburban homeowner who is
struggling to pay her taxes? A fair settlement was not possible. The issue
had to be litigated. Change had to be based not only on political
campaigning and legislative advocacy, but also on fact-finding litigation
and Supreme Court decisions.
Litigations involving desegregation and voting power still remain
incomplete. We have not fully met equal opportunity and democratic
requirements. Yet, we are further along because of decisions to litigate
rather than to settle in these fields.
II. WHEN SETTLEMENT Is ESSENTIAL
There are cases in which timely and efficient settlement is essential. The
Agent Orange dispute is one such example.13 In re Agent Orange involved
a serious national issue presented by sick Vietnam veterans who were being
ignored by their government. Litigation would likely have resulted in the
rejection of veterans' claims based on the lack of scientific support as well
as the manufacturers' government contractor and war powers defense. 14
Nevertheless, it was apparent that there had been some negligence in the
production of Agent Orange and other herbicides that were designed to be
widely sprayed to protect our ground troops in Vietnam from enemies
hiding in the jungle. Excessive amounts of dioxin, a carcinogen, had been
11. See WMCA, 377 U.S. at 634; see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533.
12. WMCA, 377 U.S. 633.
13. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
14. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (recognizing
government contractor defense); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7,
15-17, 24-27, 85-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. to
dismiss claims of Vietnamese nationals and listing similar cases).
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negligently incorporated in the herbicides supplied to the government. An
appropriate resolution could only be achieved through settlement, with the
considerable efforts of the parties and Kenneth R. Feinberg, one of the
court-appointed special settlement masters in the case.
Settlement gave those who might have been exposed a ten-year insurance
policy against diseases that might arguably have been caused by Agent
Orange. It set up a national chain of social work agencies in all fifty states
to serve individuals claiming exposure and their families. 15  This
disposition muted some of the veterans' political distress while they
organized for further assistance from Congress. Ultimately, the federal
government provided relief through a program administered by the U.S.
Veterans Administration. Such a legislative response is rare. In cases of
mass harm where no timely and appropriate remedy is otherwise available,
the courts are obligated to act, using all available tools, including
settlement.
III. WHEN SETTLEMENT IS DESIRABLE FOLLOWING SOME
INDIVIDUAL ADJUDICATION
Most cases are probably best administered with some trials and summary
judgments used to create a rational framework for global settlement. An
example of this is the some seventy asbestos cases that I tried. 16 They arose
from warship construction in the Brooklyn Navy Yard during World War
II. The verdicts in those fully litigated jury cases furnished an estimate of
values necessary to craft the settlements of many thousands of cases. A
number of trials were required, but settlement of the majority of cases was
desirable to timely alleviate the hardships of the many seriously affected
victims and their families.
The asbestos cases as a whole on a national basis were mishandled, in
part because of the failure of the Supreme Court and our intermediate
federal appellate courts to recognize the potential utility of a national class
action or series of class actions. Instead, the courts focused on cases in
which the attorneys for the plaintiffs overreached and acted unethically.
Rather than considering corrective action to prevent overreaching by the
plaintiffs' bar, the courts used these cases as a basis for almost destroying
the class action as a vehicle for resolving serious asbestos matters on a basis
reasonable to both industry and injured. Meanwhile, Congress did nothing
to avoid what proved to be a financial and litigation disaster.
In the Suffolk County Developmentally Disabled case, fact-finding
litigation followed by a settlement decree served to reduce dreadful
conditions for young people in a state facility and gave parents and
15. Jack B. Weinstein, Preface to THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM VETERANS AND THEIR
FAMILIES: SURVIVORS OF WAR: CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE xi-xii (Dennis K. Rhoades et al.
eds., 1995) (discussing Agent Orange Class Assistance Program (AOCAP)) [hereinafter
LEGACY]; id. app. H, at 493-96 (listing AOCAP-sponsored social services by state).
16. See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1996).
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community organizers time and support for political advocacy. 17 The result
was the transformation of a huge Bedlam-type institution into modem
cottage family-style living accommodations that replaced inhumanity with
dignity and respect for the children and the adults they grew to be.
In the diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases, mothers who had taken the drug
diethylstilbestrol gave birth to daughters whose reproductive organs were
seriously injured. A relatively small number of the cases were tried, setting
matrix patterns for subsequent settlement.18  The most important
constructive action coming out of the DES litigation was taken by the state
appellate courts in New York and California. They modified tort law so
that where the parties could not tell whose product had been used, the
recovery would be based on the percentage of each DES manufacturer's
production during the year when the mother took the drug. A single trial
established year-by-year production ratios.
The Breast Implant litigation suggests why prompt individual trials and
other dispositions on the merits are sometimes essential to safeguard against
claims that are without merit. Daubert-based19 decisions in the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York and in the District of Oregon cut off
plaintiffs' expansive claims that lacked scientific merit.20 A more robust
national trial approach might have avoided unnecessary bankruptcies faced
by defendant companies.
Each of these, and many other, litigations provides insights that support
or diminish the arguments by Bok or Fiss. Each litigation has individual
characteristics of fact, law, and psychological dynamics. And each has to
be handled in a way that is sensitive to an enormous diversity of political,
economic, and other pressures and considerations.
IV. CASES OUTSIDE THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE
The cigarette21 and gun22 cases that have been before me do not fit the
suggested tripartite structure of (1) settlement not possible; (2) settlement
critical; and (3) settlement desirable based on a rational framework set by
some litigation. These cases were significantly complicated by a political
17. See Soc'y for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 745 F. Supp. 879
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (approving settlement); see also Soc'y for Good Will to Retarded Children
v. Cuomo, No. 78-1847, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 1993) (order closing case on
finding that parties fully complied with terms of settlement).
18. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
20. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding scientific evidence inadequate to prove breast implants caused systemic, not just
localized, injuries); see also Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1402, 1453
(D. Or. 1996) (finding scientific evidence of alleged systemic harm from breast implants
"speculative" and inadmissible under Daubert). The remedies in these litigations were
limited to a small number of plaintiffs alleging localized, rather than systemic, injuries.
21. See, e.g., Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006),
rev'd sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).
22. See, e.g., City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
1270 [Vol. 78
COMMENTS ON AGAINST SETTLEMENT
barrier: powerful industry and interest groups hampered legislative, court,
and administrative solutions that could have been effective in limiting
widespread harm.
In the cigarette cases, defendants skillfully avoided any assumption of
responsibility for fraudulent advertising that caused the early deaths of
millions of smokers.23 Trials were rare for a number of reasons. Except for
a few cases, such as the Florida class actions, there was a failure to come to
grips with massive legal responsibility for massive harm. There is now a
prevailing judicial view on these matters that is much more conservative
than it was in the 1950s and 1960s.
A major settlement with the state attorneys general has required cigarette
manufacturers to pay the states a large sum over many years-to be
financed primarily by profits from future smokers. Whether the recovery is
being properly spent by the states or whether the legal fees were grossly
overblown is a matter beyond this discussion. Class actions combined with
more individual trials would have been useful in providing both
compensation and deterrence.
Social disapproval of smokers, excluding smoking in restaurants and
work places, medical pressure to reduce lung cancer, laws, and taxes are
proving more reliable means to reduce cigarette use than the work of courts
or lawyers. Recent legislation allowing the federal government to regulate
tobacco products, including the amount of addictive nicotine in a cigarette
and how cigarettes may be packaged and marketed, may provide effective
pressures to stop the pushing of cigarettes by manufacturers-change that
litigation has been unable to achieve.
The handgun cases involved sales to straw buyers in states with poor
control of retail sales of guns. The guns leaked into New York through a
criminal pipeline, causing serious harm to our cities.24
Trials were frustrated by the inadequacies of the substantive law of
nuisance and the National Rifle Association's efforts to block litigation.
About two dozen cases were settled in my court. Consent decrees were
obtained against the most dangerous out-of-state sporting goods stores,
which were responsible for a disproportionate number of illegal guns in
New York.
These cases demonstrate the failure of local, state, and federal lawmakers
to protect the public from a plain and far-reaching problem in urban areas.
The resulting harm, as I see it, results not only in the deaths and
catastrophic injuries of people who are shot in our cities, but also in the
destruction of the young people who face devastating minimum sentences
of incarceration for possessing guns to which they should never have had
23. See, e.g., Schwab, 449 F. Supp. 2d 992; see also Amanda Bronstad, The Bloom Is off
the Rose for Tobacco Claims, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 10.
24. See, e.g., A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, 247 F.R.D. 296; City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd, 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008).
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access. No political, legislative, or judicial solution to prevent this carnage
has materialized.
In view of the blockage of the political route, some gun litigation prior to
settlement has proven useful and necessary. Adequate discovery and
preparation for trial has facilitated the dissemination of important
information to the public. Some of the illegal gun transport routes from
southern states to New York City have been cut off through consent
decrees.
CONCLUSION
Properly conducted and supervised, mass litigations can often best
compensate large numbers of those injured, reduce transaction costs, avoid
bankruptcies, and provide desirable deterrence of dangerous activities.
Because of the failure to utilize class and other mass actions properly, the
cost to society has often been greater, and the benefits far less, than what
should have been the case. The problem is in part attributable to failures of
industry, the medical and legal professions, and others charged with
protecting the public.
I would have preferred that the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches acted more effectively to control aspects of such large litigations
as Asbestos, One Person-One Vote, Cigarettes, and Zyprexa. Better
protective work by administrative agencies would have helped in the
Asbestos, DES, Guns, and Zyprexa litigations, and particularly in avoiding
the many injuries caused by cigarettes and handguns. Given the political
failure to provide adequate protection, the courts have a failsafe, default
obligation to provide constitutionally required protection of the public
through deterrence against dangerous conduct and reasonable compensation
to harmed individuals. 25
In light of the pragmatic bent of our lawyers, judges, legislators, and
jurors, both Bok and Fiss partly seem right, even if at times unnecessarily
dogmatic in their opposing views. Exercise of sound judgment by
administrative agencies, lawyers, corporations, and individual litigants in
the criminal and civil justice systems is required to find the right mix of
settlements and trials in the many distinctive disputes that our contemporary
complex society produces. 26
As we have seen in criminal sentencing, rigid and excessive reliance on
ideology can lead to massive injustices. The same thing may be said of
civil disputes.
25. See John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 541-43 (2005); Jack B.
Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of by, and for the People: Notes for the
Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 1 (2008).
26. See sources cited supra note 8.
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